

~~SECRET CONTROL/U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY~~

4

103

24b.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM AND INTELLIGENCE

25X1A8a

12

this is



~~SECRET CONTROL/U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY~~

~~SECRET CONTROL/U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY~~

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM AND INTELLIGENCE

I. INTRODUCTION

The Evaluation of a Revolutionary Situation. The Communist Parties of the entire world are shock brigades of the world revolution--the international revolution announced by Lenin when he stated: "We are starting a world revolution which alone can consolidate our own and assure the transition to a socialist regime." The precipitation of this revolution, however, cannot be left to chance or to local outbreaks; the timing of an "operation" is determined strictly by a combination of political, economic and social factors favorable to the launching of a revolution. Any premature action is as harmful as the failure to take advantage of a favorable "revolutionary situation."

To determine whether or not a revolutionary situation exists in any given area, it is necessary for international Communist leaders to have at hand at all times for each geographic area, information concerning all the contributing factors. Maintaining a picture of political, economic and social tensions susceptible of creating a revolutionary situation is one of the permanent tasks of the Communist hierarchy--the national Communist Parties and their liaison organs, the international mass organizations and their national affiliates. Each element of this hierarchy contributes toward filling in a part of the picture.

Studies made by the international Communist apparatus are developed into analyses of the "relation of forces" and the evolution of this relation. These analyses review the potentialities of the two camps--Communist and anti-Communist--and the probabilities which may evolve from these. The analytical work concerns not only the activity of the "enemy" (the state and the classes) but also anything concerning the development of Communism anywhere in the world, its difficulties and its failures as well as its progress. The Communist authors of these analyses are thus partly at least, simultaneously actors as well as writers, a fact constituting a source of weakness and possible error.

The Importance and Political Significance of Intelligence. Of the great amount of intelligence collected by Communists some of it is without visible interest. Collection of information, however, is in itself a virtue, an act of political significance, since it serves as a means of keeping cadres and militants on the alert during periods of relative inactivity.

~~SECRET CONTROL/U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY~~

~~SECRET CONTROL / U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY~~

From a Communist's point of view, every capitalist regime is unlawful, therefore, it is his duty to fight against it by every means. Eventual clandestinity is the logical result of the non-acceptance of a capitalist government. This ethic necessarily influences the methods and atmosphere of activities of the Communist organization--particularly the work of collecting information. There is a constant interplay between the "special" or illegal activities, the overt political action, and the normal organizational work.

The term "political significance" must be understood. Collection and the utilization of information are closely allied to political action; the former conditions the latter and vice versa. This interaction has been defined in the following formula: "The idea that one has of the relation of forces is a chief element of this relation of forces." In other words, the detailed picture of the activity of the Communist world and of the action of its adversaries, placed in the hands of the Communist leaders, is exploited for political, organizational or agitation-propaganda purposes, in order to recruit new adherents to the movement or to provoke reaction from the "enemy". The result is a continuous evolution of the "relation of forces" which constantly modifies the picture prepared by the Communists.

- 2 -

~~SECRET CONTROL / U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY~~

~~SECRET CONTROL / U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY~~

II. Guide for Information Procurement

Information Procurement is Related to Agit-Propaganda Themes. Communist collection of information is related more or less directly to the three topics of agitation-propaganda defined at the November 1949 meeting of the Cominform:

- struggle for peace and against warmongers
- elimination of Titoist spies
- unity of action for the working class.

According to Leninist doctrine, "in assimilating this or that element of agitation, the masses spontaneously translate these into the language of action"; this formula is equally valuable as it pertains to the collection of information, the necessary prelude of action.

This theory involves an important corollary: wide dissemination of agit-prop themes creates a favorable climate for the collection of information and furnishes for this collection an indispensable psychological support. Therefore directives of the Central Committees of the western Communist parties have requested the cadres of these parties to inculcate the masses with a true "defense reflex" which will influence them spontaneously to denounce preparations for war. Collection of information for the Party thus becomes a direct and important contribution to the defense of peace.

Contributing to a "climate" favorable to the collection of information is the fact that some of the Peoples' Democracies have provisions in their constitutions granting asylum to foreigners persecuted in their own countries for having fought for the "defense of peace" or for "scientific activity". Collecting information for the Party constitutes a direct contribution to the defense of peace; thus it is fitting to reassure the supporters of those who, because of this activity, risked coming under "repressive" legislation of the non-Communist countries.

Specific Directives Request the Collection of Information. The three main topics of agitation-propaganda also serve as a direct guide for the initiated Party activists who can read between the lines and act accordingly. This guidance, however, is not considered sufficient, and therefore Party and mass organization directives formally prescribe the collection of information. The following are quotations from directives of this nature:

~~SECRET CONTROL / U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY~~

SECRET CONTROL/U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

In a circular of October 1950, Khalid Baghdash, Secretary General of the Syrian-Lebanese Party stated:

"Every Communist must report through the Party hierarchy all information that he happens to learn, whether it is a question of exact facts, doubtful or rumored stories concerning the general situation, persons in contact with the party, the machinations of foreign powers".

In 1951 the Uruguayan Communist Party distributed tracts in the industrial centers and in the country requesting the recipients to send to the Party the maximum amount of information about most diverse subjects, even about facts appearing to be without importance. It was stated that the limits of intelligence work are "good will, political sense and the patriotic ardor of each one".

In October 1951 the Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT) requested Communist trade unions of the African colonies to furnish regularly as detailed information as possible on the economic situation of the country, as well as on the nature and importance of civil and military works being undertaken by the French and the Americans.

The same concern is found on the level of the international mass organizations; the report of Mr. Henri Jourdain, Sec. of the Trade Union International of Metalworkers and Mechanics of the WFTU presented at the Conference of Metallurgical workers of the countries of Europe (Vienna, February 1952) contained the following passage:

"Our trade group will not be able to face its international obligations unless, in each country, affiliated or not, a group of comrades takes upon itself the responsibility of informing our International Union of the metallurgists and mechanics in its country.

In July 1951, the Secretariat of the World Peace Council (at Prague) wrote to some of the affiliated national organizations:

"In view of the interest which the Secretariat has in the situation in your country, and in view of the response which the World Peace Movement has there, we are interested in receiving as regularly as possible information about the struggle for peace."

- 4 -

SECRET CONTR OL /U. S. Officials Only

SECRET CONTROL/U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

In the resolution of the Administrative Committee of the Trade Union International of Seamen and Dockers reached at the meeting of December 1950 in Warsaw, one can read:

"The organizations affiliated with the International Union must keep regular, close contact with the Secretariat, and by at least three monthly reports, they must keep the Secretariat informed about current events, about the work accomplished and the results obtained. These reports must be received in time to permit the International Union to take the necessary measures."

Radio broadcasts in the French language from eastern Europe also direct collection of intelligence; thus, a broadcast of Radio Prague of 21 July 1952 stated:

"If you wish to send us information about the occupation of France by the Americans, write to Andre Carrel and Francis Cremieux, in care of Radio-Liberte, 6 Bld Poissonniere, Paris."

A leitmotiv figures in many directives: the information must include the maximum number of concrete examples, photographs, names, facts, detailed statistics, etc. This question is more important on the national level than putting the material in good order; thus in July 1951, the WFDY told its national affiliates that if they met with difficulties in the presentation of material collected, they could send it "in bulk" to the Secretariat.

Special Directives Issued in Form of Questionnaires. Agitation-propaganda having created the necessary psychological conditions, and general directives having underlined the permanent nature of information collection, special directives then specify in detail the points which should be amplified in Communist reporting at any given moment, for any given area.

Special directives are generally transmitted as questionnaires appearing in circulars widely disseminated. The questionnaires are presented either in unedited form (forme brute), or more often accompanied by an explanation of the reason why the information is requested. It is interesting to note that each international meeting is generally preceded by a detailed inquiry. A few examples of special direction are given here:

- 5 -

SECRET CONTROL/ U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

SECRET CONTROL/ U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

Unedited questionnaires

The Austrian Communist Party transmitted to Communist members of the councils of enterprise living in the French Zone questionnaires of the following type:

1. Military Information

For a given locality:

- military construction
- use of these constructions
- kinds of units, total strengths
- if a motorized unit, state type of vehicles
- munition depots, position, importance, kind of ammunition stored
- military work carried out near bridges, routes, railroad crossings, tunnels, etc.; mine shafts; who carried out these activities.

2. Economic Information

For a given enterprise:

- nature of production; quantities produced;
- number of workers, hours of work
- how long has the factory operated? Details concerning its ownership.
- for whom is it working? Where are the orders delivered?
- stocks of supplies

In July 1952 the Communist Party of West Germany transmitted through its "Agricultural Sections" District Party directives requesting information about requisition of land for military purposes. The questionnaires were worded as follows:

How many hectares were requisitioned in the district? The kind of land. Location of requisitioned land. Requisition plans. Registered protests. Organizations which objected. Position taken by local authorities. Do deputies of the Landtag and the Bundestag live near these territories? Do Party members of sympathizers live near these areas? Are there other people who could be influenced to collaborate in protesting against these military projects? Addresses of these people?

SECRET CONTROL/ U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

The Association of Liberation of the Chinese, a mass organization seeking to group under the Communist banner the Chinese of Indo-China, requested its basic organizations to procure the following information:

- evolution of the strength of the Chinese colony, movements of population, causes of displacement
- attitude of the Chinese emigres concerning the Vietnam government, the Communist Party of Vietnam, the USSR, and the popular democracies, Chinese-Vietnam relations, the reactionary Chinese, French and American imperialists the puppets of Bao Dai,
- plots of the enemies of the Chinese, etc.
- agricultural activity of the emigrants, their difficulties, their attitudes about the distribution of land, the influence of this policy, etc.
- attitude of Chinese emigrants toward Vietnam currency
- have the Chinese emigrants understood the "new economic policy" of the government
- the attitude of the Chinese emigrants toward the economic oppression of the enemy
- cultural questions: number of "illiterate Chinese emigrants" new schools, sabotage of cultural activities by the enemy
- military questions; precautions taken against traitors, Chinese participation in the militia, in sabotage, in resistance activities: material and financial support of the struggle; injuries suffered by Chinese emigrants

Questions Preceding an International Conference

Among the recent examples, intelligence work was required:

- on the occasion of the meeting of the Executive Committee of the International Federation of Democratic Women, June 1951: careful study of the military budgets of each nation
- before the meeting of the Council of the World Federation of Democratic South, August 1951: research on the consequences of "la politique de guerre" and of armament on the life of youth
- on the occasion of the International Assembly of Metallurgical Workers opposing the Schuman plan (June 1952): investigation of working conditions, questions of labor supply, arrangements made or planned to oppose the Schuman Plan.
- in view of the World Congress of Teachers, organized in 1953 by the Trade Union International of Teachers, survey of teaching personnel, its political composition, its methods of organization, its demands, its relations with the political power in each country.

SECRET CONTROL/ U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

Three questionnaires are quoted in full length here. The first was issued by the Trade Union International of Agricultural and Forestry Workers while that organization was preparing an indictment of the colonial system in Africa, which was to be sent by the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) to the Social and Economic Council of the United Nations. The second questionnaire originated with the Trade Union International of Mechanics and Metal Workers of the WFTU in the summer of 1952 and had as its purpose the collection of data for an international union of representatives of naval construction workers. The third questionnaire was issued prior to the Moscow Economic Conference of April 1952.

1. Anti-Colonial questionnaire about Africa

- the actual status of the mass of farmers
- possibilities of agricultural development of the land
- influence of the colonial system (which, far from being an element of progress and civilization, constitutes pillage of the African resources and an obstacle to the economic and social development of the territories)
- the query included detailed questions about:
 - colonial law making (or its absence)
 - economic situation of the farmers
 - paid agricultural workers and their situation
 - repression
 - demographic and sanitary situation; status of education
 - colonial organizations and pillage
 - possibilities of the development of agricultural resources
 - claims which have been drawn up

2. Questionnaire about Naval Construction

- a) how many workers are employed in this industry (by shipyard or by dry dock)
- b) what are the working conditions
 - hours of work
 - rate of construction
 - security and hygiene
- c) what systems of remuneration are used and what are the wages
- d) what are the work plans:
 - threat of dismissals and unemployment
 - sources of raw materials
 - non-military construction
 - trade with eastern countries
- e) what claims are made and what are the present struggles of workers

SECRET CONTROL/U. S. Officials Only

- f) how and on what basis is unity of action being prepared and realized in the shipyards and what are the difficulties met in these efforts?

3. Questionnaire Preparatory to the Moscow Economic Conference

PART ONE: Description of the Situation of the Business or Industry in Which You are Engaged

Is this business or industry presently experiencing a slowing down of activity or a reduction of profits?
(Date of the beginning of the slackening and its importance)

To what degree does this situation affect your standard of living, and that of your associates and employees.

If possible give concrete examples and corroborating facts.

To what do you attribute this state of affairs?

In particular, to what extent do the following factors pertain:

A. Scarcity of Raw Materials

- What are the reasons for the shortages, if any?
- stockpiling of strategic materials
- rising of world market prices
- closing down of certain markets
- lack of currency

B. Restriction of Trade Channels

- a) Concerning the domestic market, has the falling off of sales come as the result of a decrease in buying power, or from some other cause?
- b) Is exportation to certain countries presently reduced or even prohibited? What countries and for what reasons?

C. Increase of Business Costs

- salaries and welfare expenses
- taxes

(Proportion of these two factors in relation to turnover and in relation to each other.)

D. Restriction of Credits Necessary for the Operation of the Business

- a) Has the authoritative lessening of credits imposed by the banks affected your economic sector?
- b) Do you consider this policy justified?

SECRET CONTROL/U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

PART TWO: Search for solutions

We invite you to consider whether an increase of production can be effected in your sector, and in the general national economy, without first eliminating the factors of economic depression which we have just enumerated.

Since general productivity apparently cannot be increased except by longer working hours or by consolidation of businesses (which would have as a result the elimination of small and middle-sized businesses) would these solutions appear desirable to you?

Do you foresee, on the other hand, the possibility of increasing international economic exchanges? Could this be done through the termination of regulations prohibiting the export of certain products to Eastern countries? Study the possibilities of exchanges with those areas.

Is not the reduction of international economic barriers, moreover, essential to an easing of political situation?

Do you see any way to lessen the fiscal burden besides a reduction of rearmaments?

Can armaments be reduced without endangering the security of the nation?

What is your opinion about the possibility of an international disarmament conference, and about the possibility of common action to achieve this?

Are you willing to discuss this subject and are you willing to support your point of view quite apart from any political obligation?

SECRET CONTROL/ U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

Interpretation of the Directives and Exchange of Experiences

General directives and the special questionnaires constitute the basis for intelligence collection. But the Party sometimes explains that these directives have no restrictive character, the only limitations being "good will, political sense and the patriotic spirit of each individual." In other words, an invitation to extend information collecting to more confidential matters is implicit in the directives. Thus when trade unions of naval construction workers were invited by the Trade Union International of Mechanics and Metal Workers to collect information on non-military construction, they assisted at the same time in collecting information on war industry as related to naval construction. In March 1952, the Austrian Communist Party (KPOG) informed its cells that surveillance of "preparations of war" implied the communication to the Party of all detailed observations pertaining to the construction of barracks and munition and gasoline dumps; installation of mine chambers on bridges, highways, centers of power supply; and military preparation of the police, gendarmerie, customs officers, etc.

It frequently happens that on the national or international level, one organization obtains better results in its intelligence collecting than a neighboring section does. A pooling of information therefore takes place to promote the total intelligence effort. Under the phrase "exchange of information", the organizations working against the same objectives communicate to each other the results of their efforts and discuss methods used, difficulties met and successes obtained. Thus on the occasion of the preparation for the meeting of the "International Conference for the Peaceful Solution of the German Problem", organized by the World Movement of the Partisans of Peace, the French and German representatives decided at the Strasbourg meeting, December, 1951, to proceed regularly with the exchange of military information.

PART THREE: Procurement Techniques

Mass Method of Information Collection

The "mass method" of intelligence procurement does not involve investigation by specialists working according to traditional rules. The idea of quantity outweighs every other consideration. Rather than keeping a small number of agents near points of critical interest, the mass system utilizes large numbers of informants placed at every level of the administrative, political, economic, social and military apparatuses. The pace of modern civilization continually increases the complexity of these organizations, and it becomes more and more difficult to obtain an overall perspective.

SECRET CONTROL/ U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

Communism takes up its observation at the base, scrutinizing especially certain sectors which, according to the Communist viewpoint, have the greatest importance for Marxist interpretation.

In l'Humanite of May 9 and 10, 1951, the following explanations were given by Madame Simone Tery concerning the investigation, undertaken by the FCP, of the "American occupation" of France. The survey was made by the combined efforts of thousands of observers, who can be divided into two groups:

(1) The 500 accredited correspondents of l'Humanite, who, "day after day, at the cost of great effort, in addition to their daily work, sent regularly and willingly, thousands of reports. These reports, "even when it was not possible to publish them" informed the Party "about anyone who was passing through any part of France." The correspondents were thus mobilized in all of France for the investigation of the "American occupation."

(2) To these 500 correspondents were added, for this investigation, section leaders, Party members, and readers of l'Humanite, all mobilized to collect information. It was a question of a "fraternal complicity" of persons who submitted carefully prepared documentation, reporting what they knew, and indicating what should be investigated.

Utilization of the Communist Organization

Legal and illegal activities of every Communist organization overlap and interpenetrate; their respective importance varies somewhat, but traces of illegal activity are found at every level of the organization. This observation obviously applies to questions relative to the collection of intelligence information, to the degree that such collection violates the law, and emphasizes an importance difference between the "mass system" and the "classical system" (of information procurement): instead of creating a special apparatus, the mass system contents itself with utilizing the entire Communist organization itself.

This principle has two important results:

(a) The observer of a determined target is the Communist militant or sympathizer who is close to the target. He can, therefore, observe as a connoisseur and report with a maximum of accuracy.

(b) The Communist organization, through the mass organizations, has access to the largest sectors of human activity, and is able at times to approach a target from several different angles.

According to its inherent nature, each communist organization is especially directed towards a certain segment of society which it is assigned to canvass. It is, however, possible to find two additional aspects in the mass method of collection:

SECRET CONTROL/U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

(1) In the event of an inquiry considered particularly important, several organizations may be directed against the target jointly with the organization normally qualified to perform the assignment. Thus, survey questionnaires emanating from the Trade Union International of Agricultural and Forestry Workers, prior to the publication of the anti-colonial indictment, were addressed not only to its affiliated trade unions but also to all the African trade unions under Communist domination.

(2) Certain organizations appear to have been founded purposely as a means of approach to a selected target; this was the case, for example, in the "Committees against the Construction of Airfields" set up in West Germany in localities where such work was in progress.

The Networks of Correspondents

One of the masterpieces of the Communist system of procurement of information is the network of correspondents organized in imitation of the "rabkor" of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This institution, which was for a long time a practice of Communist Parties, is presently being extended to the national and international mass organizations. The WFTU in particular advocates the organization of such systems on a professional basis. This was done in 1950 in the seamen's and dockers' union, and in 1952 in the Metal Workers' Union.

The existence of these networks of correspondents must not be considered as a technical (or professional) specialization. In fact, the correspondents are not paid party workers; their activity is explained only by the necessity of the Communist organizations to free themselves from bourgeois sources of information.

The networks of correspondents are generally connected with the central organs of the Communist press. Each correspondent, a confirmed Communist, is chosen upon the suggestion of the local leaders of the Party. He must have special aptitude for observation, and must keep himself informed about problems which evolve from the Party's political policy. He signs his reports with a number; the reports are generally checked by the local Party leaders. In certain countries, there are confidential bulletins for correspondents in which they exchange experiences. The correspondents are not paid, but expenses they incur in their work are reimbursed by the Party. The information collection program of these workers is very wide in scope, as illustrated by the two following projects:

SECRET CONTROL/U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

In Holland, the correspondents are instructed to report on demands for salary increases, working conditions, job accidents and their causes (especially those which are not reported in the "bourgeois press", general operations of factories, benefits, influence of non-Communists; and the prospects for a united front. They must likewise report activities of the municipal assemblies; interest themselves in the general demands of the people, in rural problems, in the problems of the middle classes, and in education and housing.

In the western zones of Austria, correspondents are requested to follow public opinion closely; provide statistics on industry, business and agriculture; report incidents in which occupation troops are involved; maltreatment of Austrians by Allied police; measures taken by the Austrian or Allies against the peace movement; preparations for war; construction of barracks and airfields; military manoeuvres; and to observe everything which concerns the Foreign Legion and displaced persons.

Two remarks will terminate this brief expose on the subject of correspondents:

(1) One network of correspondents often works for the benefit of several recipients: either a Party and a mass organization, or, as in West Germany, for the benefit of the Communist Party of West Germany and that of the Eastern Zone. In other words, the collection of information is unified, but there is a difference in the manner of exploitation by the various recipients.

(2) In West Germany, the correspondents have received instructions to avoid any action which would violate counter-espionage laws; the essential task for them is to continue their activity without exposing themselves to suppressive measures. One of them however, a municipal councilor of Fribourg, was convicted of espionage in the summer of 1951.

Activity of Agit-Prop Sections of a Communist Party

Within the purview of a study of the intelligence activities of Communist parties, special mention should be made of the units within these parties responsible for agitation-propaganda. Observations made in Austria make it possible to describe in detail the activities of an agit-prop section.

The Agit-Prop Section of the Central Committee of the Austrian Communist Party (KPOe) in Vienna receives, from the agit-prop sections of the provincial offices of the Party, periodic reports on various questions of possible interest to Party headquarters.

SECRET CONTROL/U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

Information Exploited by Agit-Prop Sections

Among subjects treated are industrial, economic and social problems; technical progress in metallurgy, the laying-off of workers, trade union conferences, social agitation. Political questions are also treated: municipal activities, local activity of government personalities. A great many of the reports deal with military questions concerning the Allies and the Austrian police, such as:

1. Incidents with occupation troops.
2. Military construction, with emphasis on details about the contractors and those authorizing this construction.
3. Photographs of police equipment and details about Allied Officers responsible for liaison with the police.
4. Details of training given to new occupation troops.
5. Supplies of ammunition.
6. Movement of armored vehicles.
7. Progress of airfield construction, etc.
8. Details of security measures taken when important officials travel, especially security precautions taken in railway stations.
9. Reports on military transport by rail.
10. Movements abroad of suspected persons (without doubt in order that these persons can be watched by another Communist Party).
11. Lists of unemployed workers (so that each one can be contacted personally by a Party member.

Mechanics of Reporting

Certain observations and conclusions can be made concerning the mechanics of reporting:

- a) the reports transmitted generally carry a coded indication of the source, or a statement such as: "a confidential contact in the factory cell of _____ reports that ... etc."

SECRET CONTROL/U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

b) Frequently, questions considered of most interest are explored further and supplementary, detailed reports are requested.

c) Agit-prop sections sometimes query Party headquarters to learn if the information they have collected has been confirmed.

d) They report difficulties encountered in their intelligence work (arrest of militants caught in illegal acts) and ask what attitude they should adopt.

e) Agit-prop sections sometimes request permission to publish in the local Communist press information which they have collected.

f) The Austrian Communist Party believes that it is well informed on the activities of the police, as it has two informants in that organization, one in the communications section and the other in the research section.

g) The Agit-prop sections of the Austrian Communist Party, in accordance with instructions from the Central Committee, refuse offers of intelligence information from certain types of persons (employees of brothels, for example), even though they may be well placed to obtain details of military activity.

Technical Aids

Communist organizations tend increasingly to employ modern techniques in intelligence activity. The following examples have been noted:

1) In Austria, the use of telescopic lenses for photographing military installations;

2) In Italy, attempted installation of telephone taps.

Members of Austrian factory cells were advised that some component parts, believed at first to have no possible military use, could be used in the assembly of armored vehicles or artillery pieces, and were requested to purloin samples of such parts. They were instructed to send these to Vienna, where the Party leadership would have them examined by experts in order to determine if they were to be used for the rearmament of the Western powers.

SECRET CONTROL/U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

PART FOUR: Methods of Transmitting Information

Declassification of Secret Material

The Communist apparatus is less interested in the confidential nature of an information report than in the possibilities of exploitation that it furnishes. Nevertheless, in the mass of information collected, there are confidential reports. Since 1917 the program of the Russian revolutionists included a clause demanding the disclosure of secret treaties and documents. International communism has remained faithful to this tradition. In declassifying documents, Communist organizations function as "transformers" of secret information into overt information which can be freely transmitted.

Communist opposition to secret government activity is seen in the following types of incidents:

- 1) Party orders to militant Communists working in armament factories to refuse to sign oaths of secrecy concerning military secrets.
- 2) During various Communist espionage trials, Communist newspapers have published the text of the information which the defendants were accused of having procured.

Influence of Mass Organizations in Opposing Secrecy

The role played by a specialized mass organization, such as the World Federation of Scientific Workers, should be taken into account. At every opportunity, this federation and its affiliates declare themselves in favor of extensive international exchange of scientists and technicians and of the communication of discoveries and working methods "for reasons of international peace." Such organizations regularly take a stand against the maintenance of secrecy concerning nuclear and bacteriological research.

Mechanics of Transmittal of Information

Once documents have been declassified and publicity has been given to confidential information, the methods of transmittal of information no longer presents any special problem. Thus the survey on the American occupation of France, which appeared in l'Humanite in the spring of 1951, was transmitted to Budapest, Warsaw and Moscow as a "review of the press." If one wishes to analyze further the mechanics of transmittal, it is well to begin at the base—that is, at the collection point of the "raw" information. Generally speaking, no information report reaches the highest levels of the mass organizations or the Soviets in its original form. At each intermediary stage, there is a screening, sifting and partial exploitation of the information.

SECRET CONTROL/U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

Within a country, all methods of transmittal are used: direct contacts, telephone, postal courier, etc. When the mails or the telephone are used, a slight degree of security is obtained by the use of numbers to protect the anonymity of the informants.

We have noted in Germany and Austria, the use of communication channels composed of Communist railway employees when the information is of confidential nature (troop movements, transport of materiel, etc.). In Germany, the East-West frontier presents problems of transmittal which have been solved mostly in the following manner: the work is coordinated in West Germany at Bonn by the chief correspondent of the Information Agency of the Soviet Zone (A. D. N.); the information is sent under cover to a certain number of trusted individuals, then sent on via several secure channels into East Germany. The chief correspondent regularly crosses the frontier, receives the documents forwarded and carries them to East Berlin, taking care to avoid the western sectors of the city.

Information passed from a national mass organization to an international one generally has been transmitted via the postal system. Certain organizations affiliated with the WFTU have noticed inexplicable delays in the transmittal of reports by mail, and since the fall of 1951, the WFTU has been searching for a courier system providing greater security.

Travel of militant Communists to the Soviet Union and to the peoples' democracies has been used as a means of transmitting reports. It is well known that such travel is extremely frequent, and is occasioned by international meetings, organized trips, "peace vacations," etc. A report on the Belgian Congo, for instance, drawn up by the Colonial Committee of the Belgian Communist Party--a document indisputably of intelligence interest which contained first-hand information on mining questions and on capital investments--was taken to Moscow in April 1950 by one of the leaders of the Belgian Communist Party. In July 1952, the Swiss police arrested Professor Bonnard, of the University of Lausanne, President of the Swiss movement of the Partisans of Peace, when he was about to leave for Prague and Berlin. He was carrying a report on the International Committee of the Red Cross and its directors which was destined for the World Peace Council. Professor Bonnard had collected this material at the specific request of Professor Joliot-Curie, President of the World Peace Council, who had had personal contact with him in May 1952. The Swiss authorities considered this an act of espionage carried out in behalf of a foreign power.

SECRET CONTROL/U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

Soviet Access to Information in the Possession of International Mass Organizations

It is known that the Soviets are represented widely at the head of international mass organizations. Thus they are in a position to keep themselves informed about reports addressed to the Secretariats of these associations. For example, it is known that Serguei Rostovsky, (formerly) Assistant Secretary General of the WFTU, and a Soviet citizen, sent registered packages every three days from Vienna, to the International Department of the Central Council of Trade Unions of the Soviet Union in Moscow. It is presumed that a synthesis of reports received by the WFTU reach the Soviets in this way. This hypothesis is strengthened by the very nature of the International Department, which is responsible for liaison with foreign trade unions and which maintains contact with foreign trade union delegates who have visited the Soviet Union. If one admits that the manipulation of the international mass organizations is achieved by the spokesman of the corresponding Soviet mass organization, one can easily understand the unity of the entire system and its ultimate centralization for the benefit of the Soviets.

Some Exceptions to the Usual Channels of Transmittal

There have been some exceptions to the channels of transmittal which merit attention:

a) ROSTOVSKY, as Assistant Secretary General of the WFTU, requested the Secretary of the Confederated Trade Unions of Cameroun to inform the WFTU directly about the meeting of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions held at Duala in March 1951.

b) In October, the Central Committee of the Soviet Trade Unions of Maritime Transport Workers, with headquarters in Moscow, initiated contact with a dockers' trade union of a large port of French North Africa. The trade union in question then made use of its channel to Moscow to inform the Soviet trade unions of its strength, its problems, the victories gained in the struggle for peace and national liberation, etc., and kept its correspondents informed of everything which might be of interest.

In these two cases the procedure was the same. In Cameroun, direct passing of information to the WFTU eliminated the Union des Syndicats d'Outre-Mer and the Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT). In the case of the North African port, the CGT and the WFTU found themselves eliminated in favor of the Soviets. These exceptions can be explained in the first case by the need for urgency, in the second, by the strategic and political importance of the North African port.

SECRET CONTROL/U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

c) Liaison between the various interested organizations does not always seem to function perfectly. It is known, for example, that the Belgian Communist Party sent to Moscow an important report on the Belgian Congo; some months later the WFTU complained that it was poorly informed about this region, and, not having the report in its possession, was obliged to write to the authors of the report. In this particular case, the absence of a central trade union under Communist domination in Belgium accounts for this direct contact between the WFTU and a national Communist Party.

PART FIVE: Exploitation of Intelligence Information

The collection of intelligence brings into the possession of national and international Communist organizations a considerable mass of heterogeneous information, a large part of which may quickly become outdated. The use of this documentation presents special problems whose solution constitutes one of the characteristics of the "mass method". The intelligence which has been collected is not merely handed over to specialists for study, but is often extensively used for agit-prop purposes. Over and above this immediate exploitation, which appears to be given priority consideration, an intensive exploitation is effected within Party information offices. The results of this further exploitation may also be used in the agit-prop field.

The Communist organizations are give considerable initiative in determining the use to which intelligence information shall be put. Any information, the dissemination of which will constitute a weapon in the political battle, must be given immediate publicity. Any oversight of this principle will be reprimanded. Thus, the German Communist Part congratulated the Communist Party of the Saar on the quality of the information the latter had collected and transmitted, but reproached that Party for not having exploited the information for local propaganda.

Channels for Immediate Exploitation:

(a) The Press: The Communist Press abounds in revelations, often from excellent sources, and frequently presented in the form of photocopies of the documents themselves. Some examples of immediate press exploitation are: Sweden: The publication of a document of the Swedish Intelligence Service concerning the use of Russian emigrants as agents. Germany: Publication of a circular originating with the Allied intelligence services concerning the use of former prisoners of war in the Soviet Union.

Dissemination at the international level of information of confidential nature to be reprinted in the Communist press, appears to be handled

SECRET CONTROL/U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

by the Telepress Agency, located in Prague. That Agency has dealt with the following subjects in its communications:

- use of Japanese and Chinese Nationalist agents by the American services
- activities of the Western intelligence services against Czechoslovakia
- secret documents of the United States Department of Defense concerning the aid given to the American services by the Catholic Mission of Seoul
- secret British documents concerning the plans of the British Government regarding the Sheffield Peace Congress
- report of the Chief of the American Military Mission in Indochina to President Truman
- F. B. I. activity in the United Nations Secretariat
- commentary on a report of Roger Wybot, Chief of the French Surveillance du Territoire

Telepress Agency maintains close relations with the WFTU and disseminates for it certain information and warnings.

(b) The Radio: Exploitation by radio follows the same pattern as used for the press, but has an element of speed which the press does not enjoy. The following example is cited to illustrate the rapidity with which information can be transmitted and broadcast:

On 2 November 1950, the Communist paper LePatriote de Dijon, published information on the interrogation of an intelligence agent by the Surveillance du Territoire of Dijon. The Dijon press reaches Paris about 7:00 a. m.; the report was picked up by the Paris office of the Tass Agency and integrated in its review of the press which it transmitted to Moscow at 11 a. m. At 12:30 p. m. (French time) the news item from the Dijon paper was broadcast practically word for word from Moscow. The report was of great interest to the Belgian CP, as it concerned a person whom that Party suspected of having participated in the assassination of one of its leaders, Julien Lahaut.

One of the most effective Communist radio programs relating to France and broadcast as part of their "Voice of Peace" propaganda plan, is the program titled, "The American Period in France" ("la France a l'heure americaine") broadcast by Radio Prague. It is of interest to note

SECRET CONTROL/U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

that certain efforts at immediate exploitation have been stopped because inopportune. For example, l'Humanite once published the numbers of two policemen conspicuous for their anti-Communist attitude. Though information of this sort has never reappeared, black lists nonetheless continue to be compiled.

Intensive Exploitation. (Exploitation "en profondeur")

In each Communist Party as in each mass organization (national and international) there is a unit where documents are assembled, put into order, studied and synthesized. This reports office is generally located within the Secretariat of each organization. As an instance of "intensive exploitation" carried out by a Partisans of Peace organization, the following episode is related:

In Austria, the Partisans of Peace synthesized, in the form of a "White Book", studies made by militant Communists on war preparations. The book gives a detailed picture of the Allied occupation and of military installations in Western Austria. For the most part, the published details are accurate; some of them, notably concerning the presence of Americans in the Tyrol, brought out facts not well known to the local French commander. The "White Book" is illustrated with sketches and photos, some of them on large-scale, of military objectives in restricted zones. Moreover, this document, without including direct appeals for sabotage of installations, discusses existing security measures and contains very useful facts for eventual sabotage. For instance, the "White Book" contains the following statement: "The new bridge of Otztaler is furnished with mines in the interior of its first piling; the place is marked, at the third row of stones from the base, with a brass notch the size of a coin." Analysis of this "White Book" reveals that it was compiled by military specialists.

Intensive exploitation seems to be most highly developed in the trade union field. This is not surprising in view of the close link between trade union affairs and economic problems, and in view of the following considerations:

(a) Communist theoreticians anticipate victory of the proletariat after the collapse of the economic system of the capitalist world;

(b) the study of the economic situation of the capitalist countries furnishes Communists with the most useful themes for social and revolutionary agitation, and permits them (when Moscow does not order otherwise) to choose the best moment for action.

SECRET CONTROL/U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

The following are instances on the national and international level where intensive exploitation has been carried out by trade union organizations:

1) The "Confederal Center of Economic Studies" of the Secretariat of the Confederation Generale du Travail functions as a research section dealing with French economic problems. In close liaison with the Bureau de Documentation (Reports Office) of the CGT and the Committee of Economic Studies of the French Communist Party, it furnishes the latter with information and supplies the necessary facts for CGT delegates on the Economic Council. It is equipped to examine reports assembled by the trade federations of the CGT.

Staffed with specialists on economic problems, the "Centre Confederal" issues periodic and special studies. Some of these deal with aspects of the economic crisis in France and have appeared in the WFTU publication, "World Trade Union Movement."

Representatives of the Centre Confederal d'Etudes Economiques sometimes attend meetings of the Departmental Trade Unions (Unions Departementales des Syndicats), as for example the meeting at Annecy in November, 1951, where a program for denouncing the manufacture of war materiel was set up. At the end of the meetings, delegates to the Enterprise Committees of the factories of the department (which included an important bearings plant) were invited to:

procure a list of the customers of the factories

establish contact with the workers of customer factories to determine if the products were used for military equipment.

2) The Economic Section of the West German Communist Party (KPD)

This unit is responsible for the following tasks:

- a) examination of Western newspapers and economic periodicals.
- b) the exploitation of answers to questionnaires distributed by Party headquarters to Communists belonging to Enterprise Committees and to certain trade union officials. A questionnaire concerning mines of the Ruhr, for instance, contained the following questions: personnel strength (classified by age), appointments and dismissals, salaries, detailed information about the depth of the veins, problems of investments (self-financing, investments of foreign capital, E. R. P. credits), etc.

SECRET CONTROL/U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

One very successful survey concerned the copper foundry of Duisburg, and it included a list of the suppliers of raw material, a list of customer firms, the ultimate use of semi-finished products (notably, utilization by the radar industry of the United States), etc.

Members of the Economic Section are frequently reminded of the permanent security regulations concerning the transportation and safe-keeping of documents, and are warned to avoid becoming involved in a lawsuit on charges of industrial espionage.

Completed studies of the Economic Section are sent by trusted couriers to the "West Section" of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of East Germany and to the Kuczinsky Economic Institute at Berlin.

3) The Bureau de Documentation of the WFTU. The World Federation of Trade Unions receives from all over the world a considerable mass of information and reports which must be exploited whenever possible. The Federation has consequently organized within its Secretariat a "Bureau de Documentation" which has modeled its filing system on that used at the International Labor Office in Geneva.

The WFTU files its reports with the aid of large-sized markers separated according to:

- classification by subject matter (basic reference)
- classification by geographic area (cross reference).

The classification by subject matter includes, among others, the following headings: agriculture, armament, unemployment, colonialism, living costs, discrimination, war economy, strikes, imperialism, inflation, raw materials, etc. Each one of these subject headings has logical sub-headings, as: Discrimination in commercial, economic, political, or racial matters. This classification by subject matter is completed by a geographic classification (by countries or regions). Thus the information, "Armistice negotiations in Korea are at a standstill because tungsten mines are at stake. Without Korea's tungsten, the U.S. would be unable to manufacture jet planes and shells, or to supply its atomic energy projects" will be noted on a basic reference card having the source and date of information and filed under the headings, "raw materials--tungsten" and "imperialism," as well as under two cross-reference cards filed under the headings, "Korea" and "United States."

SECRET CONTROL/U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

Producing Intelligence Information

The idea of "producing" intelligence information characterizes what is undoubtedly one of the most unique aspects of the "mass system" of information collection. As opposed to the "classic system," which connotes the collection of information already available in the form of reports, patents, etc., the "mass system," based on first-hand observation, is in a position to produce new information. By accumulating fragments of information, studying them synthetically from a pre-conceived (Communist) point of view, the Party, through its "mass system," is able to achieve a general perspective of a given problem which is sometimes quite original and profitable to the Party. This is particularly true when the Party's "mass system" takes on a function the government has not considered necessary to fulfill:

1) For instance, in 1950 a foreign power interested in French factories, working for national defense, reportedly tried to recruit as an agent an employee of that government service, competent to report on such matters. Allegedly, he was not able to fulfill his mission because of the fact that orders and deliveries at that time came under two separate government offices, and there was no centralization. On the other hand, thanks to the intervention of the Enterprise Committees of the armament factories, invited under the pretext of "defense of peace" to denounce preparations for war, procurement of this information was effected without difficulty by the Confederation Generale du Travail, (CGT).

2) In May 1952, C. G. T. trade unions of the Paris region and the Communist Federation of the Seine undertook a study of factories working for national defense and of the kinds of goods being produced. The Centre Confederal d'Etudes Economiques of the C. G. T. prepared a study on the profits which French manufacturers will realize from national defense orders. As far as is known, no French government office is in possession of statistics of this nature.

PART SIX: Conclusions

The Communist Postulate

There is no coherent search for information without a postulate of political strategy and a definition of policy which supports intelligence procurement. For international Communism, in spite of variations in tactics, the postulate is very clear and has been formulated many times. It can be summarized by the following statements:

SECRET CONTROL/U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

- a. The Soviet Union wants the victory of the proletariat the world over and works toward this end.
- b. The Western powers want to prevent the victory of the proletariat by all means, including force.
- c. The Soviet Union does not want war, but wants to be stronger than its enemies.
- d. Because of the superiority of the Communist economic system over the capitalist system, the Soviet Union will be able to survive the armaments race, while the West will be ruined by this new burden; the West will receive the final blow when the last colony liberates itself; internal disputes in the imperialist bloc and the progressive closing of markets will be contributing factors.
- e. Consequently, there is reason to believe that the world revolution of the proletariat will be achieved without war and within a reasonably short time. However, as the capitalist bloc will not voluntarily abandon power but will rather risk a war, the "partisans of peace" of the capitalist countries must paralyze the preparations for war until Western economy collapses.

Given these principles, there evolves a series of conclusions which may be summarized as follows:

- 1) In order to penetrate every segment of society, assignments must be distributed throughout the parties and the mass organizations.
- 2) Since intelligence information is not only the necessary prelude to action, but is closely connected with action itself, there must be constant interplay between procurement and exploitation of information.
- 3) Finally, it is reasonable to question the objectivity of the picture drawn up by the Communists and to ask if, carried away by their dialectic, they may become victims of "self-intoxication".

The Distribution of Tasks

The flexibility and complexity of the Communist apparatus--parties and mass organizations--permit excellent coverage of Western activity. The WFTU, because of its horizontal and vertical structure, is of considerable importance for intelligence procurement. Through horizontal structure (the national trade unions), WFTU leaders have at all times an exact picture of economic and social conditions in a given country.

SECRET CONTROL/ U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

Through its vertical structure (the trade union internationals) certain problems can be approached logically from a continental or international level. Thus, the seamen's and dockers' unions affiliated with the Trade Union International of Seamen and Dockers can rapidly inform the international headquarters about delivery of American arms, a subject to which they have been directed to give priority attention. Similar statements can be made concerning centralization by the WFTU of information on social security, housing, education, etc. The Trade Union International of Metal Workers and Mechanics, in collaboration with that of the Miners, follows closely all questions relating to the Schuman Plan. A "European Workers' Committee", grouping various trades, is studying the problems presented by the rearmament of Germany.

The World Movement of the Partisans of Peace and its affiliates were initially restricted in their intelligence efforts to political questions and to problems relating to preparations for war. Its vertical hierarchy has permitted (the Moscow Economic Conference, Committees for the Development of International Trade), public health (Doctors' Conference for the Study of Living Conditions, Committee of Inquiry on Bacteriological Warfare), religious matters (Moscow Conference).

Other mass organizations fill in the gaps of the picture through the normal exercise of their activities; thus the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Students' Union and their national affiliates concern themselves with military affairs, colonial problems and intellectual matters, while the Women's International Democratic Federation reports and investigates social problems, etc. Similar remarks can be made concerning the International Organization of Journalists, (certain members of which keep an eye on colleagues considered to be warmongers), the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, as well as various welfare and resistance organizations. The Communist Party in each country acts as coordinator of all information collected by the mass organizations. Communists militants in each mass organization set the tone of the surveys conducted. For particularly important questions, the entire apparatus of the Communist Party is used to further the procurement effort and to exploit the information.

The Interplay of Procurement and Exploitation

From a study of this interplay as exemplified in the activity of one mass organization--the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY)--two facts are brought out:

SECRET CONTROL/U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

1. the perfect coordination of action in any given field between the mass organizations and the Communist Parties;

2. the close liaison existing between procurement and exploitation of information on the local and international level.

The WFDY organized in February 1953 an "International Conference for the Defense of the Rights of Youth". In order to acquire material for debate the WFDY requested its affiliates to carry out an extensive survey concerning:

a. conditions affecting young people in each country (social structures, educational problems, working conditions, unemployment, discrimination, (public health, military service, etc.)

b. youth organizations--including reactionary groups--, their influence, their methods of action, work among unorganized youth, cooperation with organizations not affiliated with the WFDY, participation of youth in trade union activity, etc.

The survey was organized most carefully: various questionnaires were drawn up according to towns where the young people lived or their places of work or study; The WFDY requested the WFTU to procure information which the former lacked: the different categories of young people, their geographic location or their place of work; particularly questions concerning youth in rural areas. The WFDY considered as integral parts of the work of the survey the study on youth made in February-March 1952 by Humanite, and that made by l'Avant-Garde.

According to instructions of the WFDY the first results of the survey were utilized at the place of collection as basic points for the development of the claims of youth. Thus in Italy, where investigation committees were formed, the survey established that in Turin, for example, there were 15,000 young unemployed, but also there was the possibility of employing immediately more than 10,000 young people. Following the survey, various measures were taken--petitions, delegations, strikes-- these had concrete results such as the opening of various work projects, professional courses, etc.

Another example was furnished in West Germany where the director of a steel factory, returning from a visit to the United States, had tried to introduce a new method of job analysis and evaluation. Preparatory to the

~~SECRET CONTROL/ U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY~~

conference some young workers made a detailed study of working conditions and were able to prove that this "evaluation" brought to the owner a supplementary profit of 15 (German marks) a week per worker. As a result, the workers immediately protested.

Another form of interplay is found between the information and the action taken. At each echelon of the Communist apparatus the activity has two aspects: (1) observation and criticism of the Western world, and (2) propaganda advocating a Communist society. These two forms of activity are concomitant and generally come from the same Communist organizations.

Self-Intoxication.

Communists denounce objective and complete information as a form of "liberal" hypocrisy. Intelligence and information for them are weapons in the battle of the classes and not destined to reflect events objectively. Under these conditions, one may ask whether Communists are not prisoners of their own dialectic guided by narrow patterns of thought from which they cannot escape without being accused of deviationism and whether, as they observe the non-Communist world, their principal concern is to confirm the broad lines of the picture prepared by international Communism.

It seems that the prime preoccupation of Communists is to emphasize the contrast between this picture and the Western world. One network of correspondents in Austria requested informants to present their reports with a "progressive" slant, that is, to emphasize that which was unfavorable to the Western bloc. In Germany, a Communist network furnished false and slanted information concerning the Alsatian canal, picturing it as draining the land of the area, having an unfortunate effect on the harvests in that region, increasing the poverty of the farmers, diminishing production of electrical energy, etc.

In Germany also, correspondents speak of the scoop made by one of their colleagues who used photographs of mine chambers at the foot of the Lorelei rock to prove the existence of a tremendous plan envisaged by the western powers for obstructing the course of the Rhine and causing vast floods in case of Soviet attack.

At the time of the World Peace Council meeting in Oslo (March-April 1952), members who considered the basic reports about bacteriological warfare unconvincing were told that proof of the facts was less important than the immense possibilities for agitation which the affair provided.

~~SECRET CONTROL/U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY~~

Political observers representing the Tass Agency deserve commentary here. They send daily reports to Moscow, using excerpts from the bourgeois press (in the case of France) only if they develop themes expounded by international Communism. The larger part of these reports are drawn from the Communist press, which is termed an "official source". The general theme of Tass reports from France pictures the French people as being governed by a small government clique completely dominated by Washington and remaining in power through resort to terrorism and police action. The aim of the French government, according to Tass, is to rearm Germany so that it can start an aggressive war against the Soviet Union. The reader of these reports gets the impression that a Communist regime could very easily be installed in France.

As an illustration of the lack of objectivity of Tass reports (due to reliance on the Communist press) the following episode is related: Concerning Parliamentary debates on the Schuman plan, the Paris office of Tass had at first reported (early December 1951) that confidence would be accorded to the government. But the Communist press seemed to modify this first view and subsequently Tass noted a constantly growing opposition to the plan which had been aroused by thousands of letters and petitions to the deputies. In view of such Tass reports, Moscow was most disagreeably surprised by the "incomprehensible" results of the voting. The Soviets could not understand why a majority of the deputies approved the plan while trade unions and industrialists opposed it.

The Paris Tass office explained that votes had been purchased with dollars, and undertook an inquiry of the matter in order to disclose the machinations and manoeuvres which caused this scandal as well as the identity of those "who brought the Chamber of Deputies to its knees" (sic).

It remains to be seen if this "conspiracy of conformity" imposed by the necessity of agitation-propaganda leaves any possibility for objective analysis. It is now admitted that the intervention of international Communism in Spain at the time of the Civil War was the result of an error of judgment in the analysis of the situation in Spain. The Nazi regime furnishes instances where its leaders were victims of similar errors despite the quality and accuracy of their intelligence. Basically, it is a problem of the train of human thought when it allows itself to be dominated by national or partisan passion.

- 30 -

~~SECRET CONTROL/U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY~~